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Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?

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ABSTRACT

The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan's potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.

Keywords: Japanese Foreign Policy, New Security Legislation, Internationalism, Security Policy, Security Autonomy

Sınırlardaki Japonya: Japonya Hala Bir Sivil Güç mü?

ÖZET

2015 yılında Japonya meclisinden geçen Yeni Güvenlik Kanunları (NSL) kamuoyu ve akademi dünyasının bir kısmında Japonya'nın engellerinden arınmış bir şekilde davranma ihtimalini artırmasından dolayı bölgenin istikrarını bozabileceği yönünde endişelere yol açmıştır. Bu çalışma sivil güçler ontolojisini neoliberal analiz çerçevesi içerisinde ele alarak 2015 NSL kanunlarını ve etkilerini üç başat sivil güç özelliği; uluslararasılaşma, güç kullanımının kapsamı ve güvenlik politikasının bağımsızlığı üzerinden incelemektedir. Analiz ve ampirik inceleme göstermektedir ki, 2015 anayasal yeniden-yorumlamanın toplu savunmaya izin vermesinden ve bu yolla uluslararası güvenlik aktivitelerinin kapsamını genişletmesinden sonra bile Japonya hala dar bir çerçevede sivil güç olarak tanımlanabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Japonya Dış Politikası, Yeni Güvenlik Kanunları (NSL), Uluslararasılaşma, Güvenlik Politikası, Bağımsız Güvenlik

Introduction

“There is no homecoming for the man who draws near them unawares and hears the Sirens’ voices”.¹

In a prominent study that contributed to the development of the concept of civilian powers, Gunther Hellmann allegorized sirens’ voices in Homer’s timeless classic, *The Odyssey*, to the corrupting and intoxicating effects of power, which are so enchanting that they cause those who give into their seductiveness to steer toward the rocks and precipitate their doom.² The hero of Homer’s work, Odysseus, could have avoided this tragedy only by having himself tied firmly to his ship’s mast with ropes.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when concerns emerged in Europe about the potential path that the now-dominant Germany might choose in the future, Hellman drew an analogy between Odysseus and Germany, which during the 1930s indeed steered toward the rocks drawn by the sirens of power and toward a tragedy for itself and all of Europe.

The event that triggered Hellmann’s work was the reunification of Germany in 1990. In its immediate aftermath, this event created considerable speculation about the type of foreign policy choices that the newly enlarged Germany might make and what these choices would mean for the peace and stability of post-Cold War Europe. After all, it was the nineteenth century emergence of a unified “Gulliver” Germany in the middle of Europe that had upset the fragile balance of power, resulting in two world wars and millions of deaths. A unified Germany in the uncertain post-Cold War era worried many. Those with less faith in Germany’s societal and normative transformation were unsure whether to proceed more rapidly with European integration to tighten the ropes tying Odysseus to the mast or to abandon such hopes and return to balancing. Others, mostly Germans themselves, argued that most of the success of post-war Germany was a result of Germany’s self-binding, pointing to the absurdity of the supposition that Germany would risk destroying its postwar accomplishments and its current envied place in the world. While the neorealists focused on the structural effects that would inexorably pull and push Germany toward the path that would lead it to become a potentially dangerous military power (i.e., sirens), neoliberals emphasized that Germany’s involvement in a multitude of international institutions, its enmeshment in the international economic system, and its federalist system and democratic norms (i.e., ropes) should keep Germany as a respected and reliable partner within the Western alliance.³

In Japan, similar discussions have emerged each time that the country has introduced laws reinterpreting the peace constitution and/or redefined the scope of the activities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), such as increasing the level of the contribution to peacekeeping. Compared with Germany, Japan has received less credit for crafting a potentially peaceful future. In Germany’s case, the arguments tend to emphasize Germany’s international enmeshment, while in the case of Japan constitutional limitations attract the most attention, and the conclusions are less clear.

It was the 2015 reinterpretation of the constitution, called Japan’s New Security Legislation (*Heiwa Anzen Housei, hereinafter NSL*), passed through the Upper House of Japan’s National Diet

1 Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. E.V. Rieu, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1946, p. 190.

2 Gunther Hellmann, “The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening?”, *German Politics*, Vol. 6, No 2, 1997, p. 29-57.

3 Ibid., p. 30-32. See also Bahadır Pehlivan Türk and Birgül Demirtaş, “Civilian Powers and Contemporary Global Challenges”, *Perceptions*, Vol. 23, No 1, 2018, p. 1-7.

on 18 September 2015, that triggered the most serious discussions of whether Japan had begun to steer toward becoming a military power, heeding the songs of sirens that it chose to ignore for so long. These bills (frequently deemed “epoch making”) represented a revision of the scope of Japan’s security activities and the limitations governing the SDF. The 2015 NSL marks an important change because it legally allows for a limited collective defense ability, which Japan lacked before. This initiated a discussion about whether Japan has abandoned its pacifism. Studies arguing that Japanese pacifism is still alive and/or NSL is a continuation of Japanese international peace activism point to the strict limitations on the use of force, the path dependency emanating from the historical evolution of security thinking that emphasizes cooperation, and the persistence of pacifist norms in Japan.⁴

On the other hand, since NSL recognizes collective defense ability, according to critics, this can potentially entrap Japan and its allies in international conflicts. Therefore, on the other side of the debate it is perceived as an end to Japanese pacifism and the birth of a more unpredictable and dangerous Japan that might endanger the stability of East Asia.⁵ According to this view, even though NSL is in harmony with the previous trajectory of security policy development in Japan, the recognition of the collective defense ability marks a significant, irreversible change that can be regarded as a step ending Japanese pacifism⁶. Some arguments go even further, portraying an ‘uninhibited’ Japan. Christopher W. Hughes is perhaps the most vocal advocate of the view that the NSL marks a dangerous shift towards remilitarization of Japan and will have destabilizing consequences for the region,⁷ and there are other criticisms that regard NSL as the beginning of a potentially dangerous era.⁸

These are serious concerns that are apt to be raised in a world of rising protectionism, authoritarianism, and revisionism. The neoliberal world system has been in crisis even before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and various regimes in the world have grown more brazen in their challenge to the status quo. The United States, which has built and maintained the neoliberal world system, is not only losing its centrality, but in many aspects has demonstrated that it can behave in a way to undermine it. In such a world of turmoil and crisis, the behavior of secondary great powers such as Japan becomes more critical, and whether they can uphold the system or become another element of disruption has to be probed. Since more than half a decade has passed since the 2015 constitutional

4 For views representing a pacifist perception of Japan see Shinichi Kitaoka, “The Turnabout of Japan’s Security Policy: Toward ‘Proactive Pacifism’”, <http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/>, 2 April 2014 (Accessed: 15 August 2020); Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation: What Does This Mean to East Asian Security?”, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol 37, No 5-6, 2015, p. 296-302; Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s defense policy: Abe the Evolutionary”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 38, No 2, 2015, p. 79-99; Jennifer Lind, “Japan’s Security Evolution, Not Revolution” *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 July 2015, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-security-evolution-not-revolution-1437410475> (Accessed: 15 August 2020).

5 For views arguing a ‘radical-shift’ in Japan’s security understanding, see: Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End?*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’ and Balancing China’s Rise”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol 9, No 2, 2016, p. 109-150; Sebastian Maslow, “A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Evolving Security System”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 55, No 4, 2015, p. 739-765; Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Strategic Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity or Radical Shift?”, *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol 43, No 1, 2017, p. 93-126.

6 E.g. Karl Gustafsson et al., “Japan’s Pacifism is Dead”, *Survival*, Vol 60, No 6, 2018, p. 137-158.

7 Hughes, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’”; Hughes “Japan’s Strategic Trajectory”.

8 E.g. Bryce Wakefield and Craig Martin, “Reexamining ‘Myths’ About Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change-What Critics (and the Japanese Public) Do Understand about Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation”, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, Vol 10, No 54, 2012.

reinterpretation relaxed the limitations on the use of force by Japan, it is high time to investigate its effects on the developing security cooperation to understand if Japan's behavior is proceeding toward harmony or discord with its allies.

This study proposes that such an analysis can be done by applying the concept of civilian powers first developed by Hans W. Maull⁹ and by placing it within the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm in IR, in order to better understand the implications of NSL and Japan's potential transformation. As mentioned elsewhere, as a distinct perspective, neoliberalism has been more marginal in studies on Japan's security policy.¹⁰ This should not be surprising since neoliberals reject the realist hierarchy of issues that places security on the top.¹¹ Arguably the most dominant paradigm applied to Japanese foreign policy has been constructivism.¹² However, these studies focus on the changing domestic normative political context, mainly emanating from shifts in Japan's security environment, and the normative effects of international *civilian* cooperation. There is still need for the development of additional tools that can specifically handle the international *security* ties that NSL and the constitutional allowance of collective self-defense capability potentially opens up. Furthermore, since the diffusion of norms studied by constructivism still necessitates the material basis of institutions studied by neoliberalism (and similar platforms that enable social interactions), the marginalization of liberalism in the literature should be regarded as a deficiency, and this study aims to fill in a part of the lacuna.¹³

To overcome this gap, merging the concept of civilian powers with the neoliberal paradigm can be especially helpful. Liberal IR theory's fundamental premise is that "the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior".¹⁴ The analysis in this study shows that path dependency plays an important role in defining the extent and limits of Japan's civilian power behavior and its international security cooperation. While the defensive realist paradigm focuses on exogenous determinants, neoliberalism allows the addition of domestic legal and bureaucratic transformations to enter into the analysis.

However, neoliberalism is more involved with the regulation of adversarial relations among states and does not sufficiently examine how behavior is regulated *within* an alliance regime. Instead, it takes harmony of international behavior among the cooperative states as given. Our focus here,

9 Hans Walter Maull, "Germany and Japan: The new civilian powers", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No 5, 1990, p. 91-106.

10 Hughes, "Japan's 'Resentful Realism'", p. 112.

11 For some works using realist perspectives on Japanese foreign policy analysis: Hughes, "Japan's 'Resentful Realism'"; Hughes, *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy*; Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Changing International Role" in Thomas U. Berger et al. (eds.), *Japan in International Politics: the Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2007, p. 1-22; Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, New York, Palgrave, 2001.

12 For studies utilizing constructivist perspective see Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 2008; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

13 Some studies that should be defined as perspectives of defensive realism and constructivism are listed under neoliberalism as well. This is because of some ontological crossovers between liberalism and these perspectives. Even though Thomas U. Berger's work "Japan's International Relations: The Political and Security Dimensions", Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *The International Relations of Northeast Asia*, New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 101-34 is listed under liberalism by some studies because of its depiction of Japanese 'Cautious Liberalism' (i.e. Hughes, "Japan's 'Resentful Realism'", p. 119), it should be regarded as an analysis within the constructivist paradigm as its focus is mostly on normative aspects.

14 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol 51, No 4, 1997, p. 516.

on the other hand, is on the questions concerning the continuity of harmony between Japan and its allies, and whether Japan can go 'rogue'. In the words of Andrew Moravcsik, "societal 'lock in' effects and the resulting stability of state preferences, not the costs of interstate bargaining, monitoring, and sanctioning" that "make domestic policy reversal ... costly" are the focus in this study.¹⁵ Since norm diffusion among Japan and its allies (i.e. the United States, Australia) are assumed as given, adopting the constructivist paradigm and analysing norms would not add much to our understanding more than existing studies already have.

The civilian power approach, in the form developed by Maull, incorporates the 'lock in' effects in its framework, since it includes security cooperation among allies sharing similar norms as one of its focuses. It also provides the tools to qualitatively measure Japan's security behavior vis-à-vis its allies. The argument in this study is that Japan is involved in a *nascent* security community,¹⁶ developing in Indo-Pacific, and its behavior is within the parameters of a 'civilian power'.

Before proceeding, another important point has to be made. Traditionally, the civilian power concept has been used in the Japanese security debate to identify the pacifist, non-military approach associated with the Yoshida Doctrine.¹⁷ However, the civilian power ontology adopted in this study, which will be explained in the following sections, is different and does *not* necessarily depict a pacifist posture. This study argues that, with the passage of NSL, Japan is no more bound to Yoshida Doctrine pacifism, but it is already on the way to be bounded with the ties imposed by security institutions and structures with its allies, first with the United States and more slowly with others. Its methods also conform with civilian power parameters. The fact that NSL is a small step that still binds Japan and conforms with the previous trajectory does not change the fact that Japan is now outside of the bounds of Yoshida Doctrine pacifism.

This study continues in the following order. First, it defines the concept of civilian power as it is developed in the discipline to understand the attributes that make a country a civilian power. It also modifies and improves the civilian power ontology in order to better capture the nature of transformation that Japan has been undergoing, as well as its regional and global implications. Then, it proceeds to study the historical trajectory toward and including the 2015 NSL, mostly through an analysis of government documents, as the genealogy and discourse of the security understanding in Japan have important impacts on our analysis and outcomes. Then, in the next section, this study analyzes these discursive and historical elements together with an empirical account of the security cooperation that Japan has engaged in since the passage of NSL to assess whether Japan satisfies the conditions that define a civilian power. The conclusion considers whether NSL could be considered a step away from the path of civilian power or a measure within its confines and the implications of structural changes in the neo-liberal world order for reducing the effectiveness and the very viability of civilian power politics.

15 Ibid., p. 537.

16 Michael Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities", Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 50–57.

17 Yuichi Hosoya, "Japan's Strategic Position: Global Civilian Power 2.0", Martin Fackler & Yoichi Funabashi, (eds.), *Reinventing Japan: New Directions in Global Leadership*, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2018, p. 197-216.

The Concept of Civilian Power in International Relations

The civilian power concept was first developed by François Duchêne and applied extensively to the EU and, to a certain extent, Japan.¹⁸ From a strict point of view, when a state deploys military means, including peacekeeping, it is no longer a civilian power.¹⁹ According to this view, Japan has already lost its civilian power status with its first peacekeeping participation in 1992. However, according to majority view, military means are embedded in a civilian power context.²⁰ This study utilizes and builds on three previous prominent contributions to the development of the concept of civilian powers as its ontological basis. The first is the seminal work by Maull,²¹ published in the immediate aftermath of German reunification, when Japan was at the zenith of its “bubble economy” and was starting to be regarded as an economic superpower. In his work, Maull noted that reunification led to worries about German or Japanese “revanchism”, a fear that these countries would revert to challenging the status quo, even attempting to replace U.S. hegemony with a “Pax Nipponica” or “Pax Teutonica”. In criticizing the alarmists, Maull emphasized the changing nature of “power” and argued for the rising functionality and usefulness of soft power—one of the early uses of the term. According to Maull, the civilian power qualification entails three conditions:

“a) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.”²²

Maull argued that the nature of international relations is undergoing a profound transformation, in which old security dilemmas and war as an agent of change are giving way to less nation-state-centered forces and more non-military means. He argued that Japan and Germany represent this new world of international relations in which the historical view of an all-out war between great powers as a tool for systemic change is becoming history itself. This change was the aim of U.S. strategy, which sought to contain Japan and Germany by anchoring them in a U.S.-centered alliance system, not only in terms of military relations (i.e., Germany’s membership in NATO and Japan’s strong security links through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) but also through a dense web of political and economic ties. These ties were built on postwar U.S.-led domestic societal and political reforms that, in effect, rendered a return to hostile militarism impossible.

According to Maull’s criteria for civilian power status, there is a strong emphasis on international cooperation. The first condition cited above directly posits the prevalence of norms of internationalism as a precondition. Military policy is addressed in the second condition, which requires that economic, non-military means have priority and that military power should be there “as a last resort”, only to support other peaceful means of interaction. This indicates that being a “civilian” power

18 François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community*, London, Macmillan, 1973, p. 1-21.

19 Karen E. Smith, “Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate”, *Politique Européenne*, No 17, 2005, p. 64.

20 Jan Orbie, “Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol 41, No 1, 2006, p. 125.

21 Maull, “Germany and Japan ...”.

22 Ibid., p. 94-95.

does not necessitate the abolishment of military options, so long as their instrumentalization is safely placed under the hierarchy and necessities of “other means of international interaction”. The third condition adds that a civilian power should show a willingness to contribute to the development of “supranational structures”, indicating that a strong focus on international enmeshment underscores this approach.

Gunther Hellmann delineated civilian power from a similar perspective, with some subtle differences.²³ After highlighting the asymmetric aspects of the power difference between Germany/Japan and their immediate neighbors, based on a Gulliver-Lilliputians dichotomy, he addressed the anxieties that emanate from the difficulty of establishing regional checks and balances against a hypothetical remilitarization of these powers by framing these discussions within the neorealist-neoliberal, inter-paradigmatic debate of the time. Hellman, like Maull, focused on the international entanglements that tie a civilian power to the international system. His analysis showed that, after a relaxation of the laws governing defense or after the attainment of non-military great power status, a civilian power tends to become more entangled in a web of Western-centered defense initiatives as well as economic integration. The difference in Hellman’s approach is the emphasis on the level of autonomous behavior of the civilian power. He sought tendencies regarding whether the newly emerging power shows inclinations of developing an autonomous defense policy or an autonomous foreign policy that verges on quasi-revisionism. His analysis showed that, in terms of its relations with both Western countries and competitor powers, such as Russia (or toward third countries such as Poland), Germany does not follow a more autonomous foreign policy that could be deemed discordant with that of its allies.

According to Hellmann, the prevalence of domestic norms encouraging international cooperation is also a gauge of civilian power status. In addition to behavioral analysis, he engaged in discourse analysis to assess the required conditions to be accredited as a civilian power. In the case of Germany, as a democracy, there were many streams advocating for different foreign policy choices within its society, including some that could exacerbate the anxieties of its neighbors. However, in the final analysis, Hellmann concluded that support for internationalization was the most prominent of these choices, even among Eurosceptics, and a “de-Westernization” of German identity is nowhere to be detected.²⁴

The best-known study utilizing the concept of civilian power to analyze Japanese foreign policy is by Yoichi Funabashi, who also emphasizes internationalism.²⁵ Funabashi’s analysis rests strongly on the behavioral shift caused by international demands on Japan (*gaitasu*). One of these demands consists of the developments after the Gulf War, when Japan faced strong pressure for “being selfish” and “not doing enough” for international peace and security. The Gulf War and Japan’s inability to contribute to it militarily are often cited as the beginning of the change in the understanding of Japanese security, indicating that an internationalist streak has always been integral since the end of the Cold War for so-called remilitarization/normalization in Japan.

23 Hellman, “The Sirens of Power ...”.

24 Ibid., p. 46. As for a more recent evaluation of Germany’s status as a civilian power in relations to its involvement in various international disputes, see: Birgül Demirtaş and Mahmut Mazlum, “Civilian Powers and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany as a ‘Realist Civilian Power’”, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 23, No 1, 2018, p. 27-62.

25 Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70 No 5, 1991, p. 58-74.

Another aspect described by Funabashi concerns the limitations of so-called “checkbook diplomacy” and Japan’s untenable postwar economic expansion. What he meant is that, as Japan started to be viewed as a technological and economic superpower – vital assets for expanding military means – its aloofness in the Gulf War was met with greater suspicion and opposition from neighboring nations. This situation was further exacerbated by the unsatisfactory speed of regionalism in Asia, which could have tied Japan in its place, in a similar way that Germany was contained by regional organizations such as NATO and the EU. In part to address these concerns, Japan emerged as an Official Development Assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid provider. Additionally, in another study, Funabashi argued that Japan should be a “global civilian power”, a great power that voluntarily ties itself to international webs of tacit control, as Japan’s quality of life is highly dependent on global security, which in turn necessitates the internationalization of Japanese foreign policy to this end.²⁶ While Funabashi’s studies were rather silent on the relaxation of limitations on the use of force and utilized the concept of civilian power more as a normative guideline than as a theoretical framework, they emphasized the drive for internationalization and integration into global peace initiatives as a prerequisite for civilian power attribution.

An analysis of these studies shows three common points in characterizing a civilian power:

- a. Internationalization: A civilian power is expected to be involved with Western or other international military and economic structures. The driving force for the relaxation of military restrictions must be the pursuit of internationalist objectives and must encompass international cooperation. Furthermore, a civilian power is expected to be enmeshed not only in economic/political structures but in security structures as well.
- b. Force as a last resort (and even then, as part of a wider international effort): As Maull suggested, the use of force is expected to safeguard “other means of *international* interaction” (emphasis added). Normative and/or legal limitations to the use of force are an expected attribute.
- c. The lack of an autonomous security policy (or a drive toward it): A civilian power is expected not only to participate but also to show willingness to develop supranational structures (or active involvement in global governance, in the case of Japan). A civilian power is not expected to show a “de-Westernization” tendency,²⁷ indicating that a civilian power cannot be an isolationist power or a revisionist one, and it must understand that its best interests and stability lie with the best interests and peaceful stable order of the world as a whole.

The above analysis shows that the majority of the literature on this concept has not only approved of the utilization of military means as a foreign policy tool; indeed, this allowance seems to be a *requirement* for a civilian power status, calling into question the appropriateness of the term “civilian”. A common thread in the literature is that military means can be applied as long as the action is not unilateral and that it aims to maintain a rules-based world order that highlights and strengthens liberal international values and norms. According to Maull, for civilian powers, the utilization of military means should not be the pursuit of selfish national interests but should be driven by values and

26 Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s depression diplomacy”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77 No 6, 1998, p. 26-36.

27 Hellmann, “The Sirens of Power”, p. 46.

norms. He defines such action as actively promoting the “civilizing” of international relations.²⁸ From this perspective, civilian powers seem to have been ascribed to the role and duty of collective pseudo-police work in the anarchical world.

Path Dependency in the Evolution of Japanese Security Thought

Path dependency suggests that policymaking systems tend to be conservative and find ways of defending existing patterns of policy. There are self-reinforcing processes in institutions emanating from various historical processes that make institutional configurations and their policies difficult to change once a pattern has been established.²⁹ Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has progressively deepened and broadened its security cooperation with like-minded states, especially the United States. However, the early beginnings of the development of a defense understanding constituted a move away from internationalization but, ironically, also a move away from an autonomous security policy.³⁰ The first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976 based Japan’s security policy on the concept of basic defense capability (*Kiban-teki Boueiryoku Kousou*). That is, the policy was exclusively defense-oriented, and the possibility of a Japanese contribution to international security was not considered.³¹ Moreover, in 1982, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), arguably the highest legal interpretative body concerning national security, declared the Japanese right to collective defense illegal. This declaration limited Japanese security entanglements to only one channel, that is, to the United States through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Hence, the early security understanding showed a very narrow (yet strong) connection to the Western security network.

The shift to internationalism started towards the end of the Cold War. To avoid the humiliation of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, when Japan’s large-scale economic support to the war effort was unappreciated, Japanese policymakers took steps for an expanded SDF role in peacekeeping and U.S.-led anti-terrorism missions, enacting a series of laws that both expanded the scope of geography and depth of SDF participation to such missions in the following decade. The first step was the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 that authorized the deployment of the SDF to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. SDF were deployed in various peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and South Sudan, among other places.³²

In 1997, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation that had remained unchanged since 1978 were revised, which expanded the geographic stretch of the SDF’s mandate to provide military assistance to the US military.³³ The Japan-U.S. security relationship was further strengthened

28 Maull, “Germany and Japan...”, p. 106.

29 B. Guy Peters et al., “The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 67, No 4, 2005, p.1275-1300; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science”, Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, New York, Norton, 2002, p. 445–488.

30 Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation: ...”; Hosoya, “Historical memories and security legislation:”.

31 National Defense Council, *National Defense Program Outline*, 1976, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>, (Accessed 15 August 2020).

32 Bhubhinder Singh, “The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-term Defensive Strategy”, *Asia Policy*, No 19, 2015, p. 54-55.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

with the October 2005 agreement of ‘U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.’³⁴ The push for a more international security outlook continued during the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government with the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. As the 2010s progressed, the domestic political structure in Japan also grew responsive to pressures from the United States calling for a more active Japanese international security role with the policies of Shinzo Abe, who actively started to push for a proactive contribution to international security, and the debate over collective self-defense intensified.³⁵

Internationalization of Security Understanding: “Proactive Contribution to Peace”

With a cabinet decision on 17 December 2013, the government announced two new documents: Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS), to set the basic course for diplomatic and defense policy; and a new version of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). These documents reflected an effort to break away from the predicament that Japan found itself in: squeezed between the persistence of deeply penetrated pacifist postwar norms that refused to change or fade; and the dizzying transformation of the security environment, which was becoming more perilous, precarious, and uncertain. The way out was the further development of a term that was already within the Japanese security discourse for some time: “proactive contribution to peace”.

The NSS states that, while adhering to traditional pacifist norms, Japan will make a “proactive contribution to peace based on international cooperation.”³⁶ In the NSS document, the word “proactive” is used 31 times; only two of these instances can be argued to be expressions of narrow national interest. Most of the references emphasize a strong contribution to international peace, and a few are used within the context of contributions to environmental issues, women’s issues, and transparency. The document also declares that Japan is a country that will be proactive in international rule making and the formulation of international codes of conduct and intends to be active in constructing a rule- and law-based international order.

The NDPG also reflects this new philosophy set in the NSS. It starts with an acknowledgement that Japan is a major player in the world and argues that the security environment has changed, although Japan has not changed. As a way to achieve its own security, Japan will be a “proactive contributor to peace” based on “international cooperation.”³⁷ Japan’s own efforts to strengthen its defense architecture are contextualized within an accentuated internationalization that strongly emphasizes cooperation with its regional neighbors and the United States as well as its contributions to peace-keeping. According to Singh, “Japanese security policymaking and practice has become more responsive, proactive, and internationalist in nature.”³⁸

34 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future”, 29 October 2005, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html> (Accessed: 15 August 2020)

35 Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation...”; Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy:”; Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Reorienting Japan? Security Transformation under the Second Abe Cabinet”, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 39, No 3, 2015, p. 405–421.

36 National Security Council, *National Security Strategy*, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf, p. 4 (Accessed: 15 August 2020).

37 (MOD) Ministry of Defense of Japan, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond*, 2013, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf (Accessed 15 August 2020)

38 Bhubbindar Singh, “Japan Embraces Internationalism: Explaining Japanese Security Policy Expansion through an Identity-Regime Approach”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No 4, 2016, p. 612.

Since the end of the Second World War, two major concerns have characterized the debate on Japanese security policy: a) the abandonment of pacifism and non-militarism and b) entrapment in U.S.-led conflicts. The development of Japanese security discourse has reflected a confluence of these two sensitivities. The concept of “proactive contribution to peace” attempts to mitigate these concerns by encompassing the push for increased security activity within an internationalist understanding of duty, which in turn is deemed vital for the long-term sustainability of Japan’s own security.³⁹ Since the 2013 NSS, this concept has become a major discursive element in the Abe administration’s security conceptualization.

The 2015 National Security Legislation (NSL)

The NSL was widely criticized domestically and abroad. It was interpreted by some as Japan leaving half a century of pacifism behind and turning itself into a military power and was even branded as the “war bill”.⁴⁰ Public opinion and media coverage aside, the NSL largely received support from experts from Japan and the United States.⁴¹

While the new security bills aim to expand the role for the SDF, they designate three new conditions on the use of military force. The first introduces limitations on Japan’s use of force in terms of the *agents* under attack, in other words, the country that is under attack. This condition can be divided into two. One is ‘when an armed attack against Japan occurs’, which is the stipulation of basic self-defense. The other is ‘when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs’, which arguably gives Japan the right to collective defense beyond collective *self*-defense. However, this right is placed under another condition that binds everything back to Japanese self-defense: the aforementioned attack on a country close to Japan must have a potential that ‘threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.’⁴² Thus, it could be argued that this stipulation still corresponds to ‘collective self-defense’. The second condition in the bill limits Japan’s ability to use force by setting it as a last resort, stipulating that Japan can decide to use force only “when there is *no other appropriate means* available to repel the attack and *ensure Japan’s survival* and protect its people” (emphasis added).⁴³ The third condition in the bill further limits Japan’s ability to use force by attempting to set the *level* of force, stating that it should be limited to the ‘minimum extent necessary’ (although this is not articulated). These conditions make it difficult to imagine the plausible scenarios that the passage of NSL adds to the ones that were already there and that could activate Japan’s use of force overseas. They raise the question of whether this bill is a *collective* self-defense bill rather than a collective *self*-defense bill and whether the bill will indeed allow Japan to be more active in international security initiatives with its allies.

39 Liff, “Japan’s Defence Policy”; Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Redefining Comprehensive Security in Japan” in Ryosei Kokubun (ed.), *Challenges for China-Japan-U.S. Cooperation*, Tokyo, Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998, p. 44-70.

40 Tomohiro Osaki, “Thousands Protest Abe, Security Bills at Diet Rally”, *The Japan Times*, 30 August 2015, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/30/national/thousands-protest-abe-security-bills-diet-rally/> (Accessed 15 August 2020)

41 Hosoya, “Japan’s New Security Legislation”, p. 297.

42 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People”, 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html (Accessed 15 August 2020).

43 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 2016, Scp. 1 Section. 2, p. 18.

The discourse used in Abe's statements defending the defense bill as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' documents show that the NSL can be regarded as part of the Japanese comprehensive security understanding, linking Japan's security and stability to international security and stability, with the declaration that "no one country can secure its own peace only by itself" and the usual reference to "proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation".⁴⁴ In all of these statements and documents, the changing nature of security threats and the internationalization of Japan's security are emphasized before arguments about self-defense are made, and these concepts seem to be woven together. In other words, the global nature of non-traditional security threats and how they are linked to Japanese security are emphasized together with the necessity for international cooperation to address them, which also requires Japan's active participation. The discourse suggests that these ideas have prevalence over traditional security concerns.

From 1976 to 2015, passing through various bills regulating international peacekeeping activities with some major overhauls, a consistent internationalist undertone has never ceased to exist in the official documents delineating Japanese security policy. However, the focus has always been on self-defense, calling the legality of Japan's contribution to international peacekeeping into question. The NSL internationalizes Japanese security by providing a legal framework for international peace cooperation activities and support activities, allowing the SDF to participate more broadly and effectively in new types of peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the condition that limits military cooperation to the scenario of an "armed attack against a foreign country resulting in a threat to the survival of Japan" indicates that the possibility of a much stronger contribution, at least at the onset, is still very small. The path dependency created by the historical evolution of its security thought still causes Japan to self-limit its international security activism.

Japan as a Civilian Power: Assessment of NSL as an Agent of Internationalization, the Scope of Use of Force, and Autonomy

Internationalization

Japan has already been deeply involved in the neoliberal world order through its economic relations in terms of investment, trade, finance, and aid. What was missing, until now, was stronger entanglement in Western (or UN-centered) security structures. The above analysis of the NSL suggests that it can only be considered a limited move toward internationalization. Nevertheless, because it relaxes SDF activities abroad through conditions of cooperation with allies and in the context of merging Japan's security with that of its allies, it can still be seen as a move toward greater enmeshment with Western security structures, as it expands the internationalization of its security activities by widening the possible geographic areas and scope of Japan's international security involvement.

The effect of NSL has first manifested itself in enhancing the U.S.-Japan security cooperation: The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were revised even before the Diet ratified the NSL bills in April 2015. The new guidelines facilitated participation in collective self-defense operations to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country even when Japan was

⁴⁴ See for instance, Kantei (Cabinet Office of Japan), *Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the Cabinet Decision on the "Legislation for Peace and Security"* https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0514kaiken.html, 14 May 2015 (Accessed 15 August 2020), and many similar references in the *Diplomatic Blue Book MOFA* (2016).

not under direct attack. The scope of Japan's support for the United States has been broadened from previous iterations to now involve ballistic missile defense, search and rescue operations, logistics support, and various maritime operations, as well as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It strengthened and broadened the security ties with the US, making it possible to open significant avenues for defense cooperation and enhanced interoperability.⁴⁵

Japan's defense cooperation with other countries has proceeded at a slower speed. Even though the enthusiasm reflected in the Ministry of Defense Papers published immediately after the passage of NSL seems to have abated somewhat, as references to "the construction of an intraregional order" and statements to "move from exchanges to cooperation"⁴⁶ are less emphasized in later years' papers, Japan steadily moves to lay the foundations of a concrete cooperation with regional actors such as Australia, India, and ASEAN. So far, Japanese international security activities seem to be consistent with previous predictions⁴⁷ that NSL would only allow Japan to expand the scope of bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with its allies, enhance defense equipment cooperation and interoperability, and build bilateral planning mechanisms for enhanced interoperability, intelligence sharing, inter-agency coordination, and crisis management. According to the Ministry of Defense, Japan is trying to enhance its bilateral defense relationships with regional countries "from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and establishing institutional frameworks ...", adding that "... multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the region are in the process of evolving from that focused on dialogue, to cooperation that *seeks to build order in the region*" (emphasis added).⁴⁸ It seems that Japan is now actively trying to build a regional security network in Asia.

One can add to these Japan's more active participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal strategic forum between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan that includes summits, information gathering on security matters, and military drills between member countries. After 2015 NSL, Japan also started to join its annual joint military exercises, deepening its military cooperation.⁴⁹ Building a mature security community⁵⁰ seems to be distant for now, but not totally out of the horizon of Japanese strategists' intentions. Japan's security activism after NSL to today shows that its policy planners seem eager to take part in a nascent security community that they hope will materialize fully in time.

The Scope of Use of Force

The limitations in the NSL bills also strengthen the second civilian power attribute for Japan: the use of force as a last resort and only then to safeguard "other means of international interaction."⁵¹ The

45 MOD (Ministry of Defense of Japan), *The Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation*, 2015, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf (Accessed 23 June 2019).

46 *Ibid.*, p. 314.

47 Liff, "Japan's Defense Policy".

48 MOD (Ministry of Defense of Japan) *Defense of Japan*, 2018, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Digest_1204.pdf, p.351 (Accessed 15 August 2020).

49 Jesse Johnson, "Malabar Military Exercises with 'Quad' Nations Begin in Message to China", *Japan Times*, 4 November 2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/04/asia-pacific/malabar-military-exercises-china-quad/> (Accessed 15 December 2020)

50 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities".

51 Maull, "Germany and Japan...", p.92.

third condition of the bill demands that the use of force be limited to the “minimum extent necessary”; and even then, as the second limitation stipulates, Japan can decide to use force only “when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people”.⁵² These conditions limit the possibility of the use of force to extreme crisis conditions, and even then, it must be within the framework of internationalized civilian measures.

In light of the analysis given above, a possible criticism that can be made of the NSL is not that it represents a move toward a unilateral security policy but rather that it retains strict limitations imposed on the use of force that might limit deeper involvement in international security cooperation. The NSL still represents a self-defense bill rather than an enablement of full commitment to collective defense, as understood in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Although it legalizes the international activities of the SDF (i.e., boosting its credentials as a civilian power), it falls short of allowing for full commitment.

The continuing limitations that are discussed above constrain Japan’s contribution to cases that are only related to Japan’s security directly, therefore limiting its civilian power credentials as well. Together with this, as Hughes points out, many of the constraints on the use of force are flexible and open to interpretation,⁵³ making a reliable prediction on the scope of use of force in the future difficult.

Autonomy

A point raised by Hughes is that Japan is not only driven by a fear of China and lack of trust in the United States, but it is also driven by a desire to reassert its national pride and autonomy.⁵⁴ Does this mean that a new ‘maverick’ Japan is emerging, potentially dangerous to the region? These concerns might be analyzed better by evaluating them under the perspective of the third attribute of civilian power status: autonomy. In other words, has Japan’s security behavior started to show “anti-status-quo” tendencies, or, at least, is there a possibility of an autonomous defense policy and (regardless of how distant) a decoupling with the West?

As exemplified above, Japan’s official security discourse has never been divorced from pacifist norms of internationalism and an emphasis on international cooperation. However, the question is whether the existence of such a discourse in the official documents or in public discussions is itself a factor that guarantees the continuation of the “way of civilian power”. In other words, instead of considering the prevalence of peaceful and internationalist norms and discourse as indications of civilian power status, we should be examining the systemic factors that tie Odysseus to the mast, rather than his intentions, as the sirens of power can be so alluring.

Interestingly, clues come from studies, some of them critical of NSL, that point to ‘great contradictions’ of the Abe Doctrine,⁵⁵ the ‘Abe Paradox’,⁵⁶ the ‘vicious cycle’ of the Japanese security

52 MOFA, 2016.

53 Hughes, “Japan’s Strategic Trajectory”, p. 99-118.

54 Hughes, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’”, p. 110.

55 Hughes, “Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy”.

56 H. David. P. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’: Japan’s new regional realism.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 20, No 1, 2018, p. 1-29; Nakanishi, “Reorienting Japan”.

regime⁵⁷, or the ‘Paradoxical logic’⁵⁸ operating in Japanese foreign policy. Hughes, predicting a dangerous path for Japan, argues that Abe is attempting to escape the post-war order and the humiliations to national pride by trying to finally achieve true autonomy and independence. However, because the Abe Doctrine views Japan’s reasserting its position as a first rank power only by deepening bilateral cooperation with the United States, in the end it leads to increased dependence on the United States. According to Hughes, “Abe’s attempts to strengthen Japan’s great power profile through deepening integration into the military alliance can only really spell dependency ... Hence, the reality is that the Abe Doctrine is in many ways reducing Japan’s autonomy in international affairs”.⁵⁹ He further argues that “it is doubtful whether Japan really could refuse, or would even want to refuse, U.S. requests and retain its previous strategic autonomy”,⁶⁰ and adds that “policymakers have come to accept and embed in national security policy the logic that Japan’s own security is indivisible from that of the United States”.⁶¹

According to Mike M. Mochizuki “[a]s early as the late 1950s, Japanese conservative leaders realized that it would be better to work with the United States rather than against the United States in order to enhance Japan’s voice and maneuverability in international affairs”.⁶² Similarly, Yoshihide Soeya argues that, there were past efforts when Japan attempted to regain some autonomy vis-à-vis the United States by revising the security treaty so that the countries were more equally positioned. All of these efforts counteractively ended in a stronger reliance on the United States and less autonomy for Japan.⁶³ He argues that Japan’s security regime is a “vicious cycle” in the sense that Japan’s security and regional policies are vague, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretation by its neighbors and its own domestic society, and the only way for politicians to overcome this limitation has been to forge stronger security cooperation with its allies and the UN.

The above analysis shows that despite the possible intentions of the so-called ‘revisionists’, time and again, systemic limitations and normative factors push Japan back into the already established dependence on the United States. The irony here is that the move toward more “autonomy” or “equality” in defense requires, in a sense, surrendering these principles.

As described above in the discussion on internationalization, after more than five years of passage of the NSL, Japan’s use of force remains limited to the security mission to Strait of Hormuz and the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. In the case of Strait of Hormuz, Japan decided to launch a stand-alone mission and chose not to join the seven-country U.S.-led task force. Even though this raised the question of whether Japan has started to show the first signs of an autonomous behavior in its security activity, the reality is different. In a study published in the Japanese press that investigates the country’s involvement in the mission by doing a technical analysis of the type of ships and weapons used in the mission as well as the nature of ongoing cooperation with the U.S. forces at the field, it is argued that the level of cooperation with the United States is considerably deeper than the initially

57 Yoshihide Soeya, “The Case for an Alternative Strategy for Japan: Beyond the ‘A9A’ Regime”, Michael J. Green, and Zack Cooper (eds.), *Postwar Japan: Growth, Security, and Uncertainty since 1945*, CSIS, Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, p. 19-38.

58 Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role”.

59 Hughes, “Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy”, p. 94.

60 Hughes, “Japan’s Strategic Trajectory”, p. 117.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

62 Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role”, p. 12.

63 Soeya, “The Case for an Alternative Strategy for Japan”, p. 27.

announced “intelligence gathering” purposes and that the Japanese maritime SDF’s level of involvement is no different than the other members of the coalition.⁶⁴ So far, Japan seems to behave within the parameters of civilian power as defined by Maull.

Conclusion

The concept of civilian power challenges the usefulness of the ontological dichotomies frequently used for Japanese foreign policy analysis, such as abnormal/normal or pacifism/remilitarization. For civilian powers, the relaxation of conditions for the use of force does not necessarily mean remilitarization or the total abandonment of pacifism; rather, it seems a necessary condition so that the civilian power can engage in international collective security activities as a responsible stakeholder in the world system. It is not disputed that Japan is firmly embedded in Western-centered international political, economic, and cultural structures. The argument conveyed here is that the only part of this structure in which the Japanese presence has been weak is international security governance. The NSL, rather than reducing Japan’s civilian power credentials, enforces them by marginally opening the door for further international security cooperation. It also limits the extent and severity of the use of force and renders the development of an independent security policy even more difficult.

The passage of the NSL might indicate that the tightness of the ropes tying Odysseus to the mast might be relaxing. However, the new limitations brought about by the NSL means that the extent of this will be small. Moreover, it might even cause further entanglement because the NSL still seems to be another step toward the internationalization of Japanese security and strengthens security cooperation between Japan and its allies, judging by its language and scope. Furthermore, the empirical evidence concerning Japan’s security behavior shows that so far Japan is acting within the parameters of a Maullian understanding of a civilian power.

The approach adopted here would suffer the same general criticisms toward neoliberalism. Realists would be skeptical to the view that institutions would mitigate the effects of anarchy. However, the above analysis of the historical and contemporary failure of Japanese so-called ‘revisionists’ to forge an autonomous security policy strengthens the neoliberal claim that “division of labor that an alliance creates and the subsequent evolution of these alliances ... indicate that institutions can ‘lock in’ particular hierarchical relationships”.⁶⁵ The ‘lock-in’ (*koteika*) effect of institutional embeddedness would contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region by imposing constraints on Japan, therefore increasing predictability.

The possibility of civilian power politics rests on the assumption that the current liberal international order will continue. The critical question that should be asked here is whether we can be absolutely sure that “the great questions of the time” will increasingly be solved through non-military means for the foreseeable future and that great power competition will be checked at modest levels, leaving space for civilian power activity and influence as stabilizing forces within the international

64 Shigeru Handa, “Korona ka to Jieitai Chuto Haken: Towareru Anzen Seiken no Yuji Taiou” (Corona Disaster and SDF’s Middle East Mission: Emergency Response of the Security Administration is Being Questioned), *Sekai*, No 933, June 2020, p.228-235.

65 G. John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi, *The Uses of Institutions: the US, Japan, and Governance in East Asia*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 18.

system. Currently the liberal order is going through a crisis of legitimacy and social purpose.⁶⁶ The United States' global leadership is being questioned, not only because of a seemingly loss of interest in the liberal international order by an increasing number of Americans including parts of its leadership, but also because of the rise of more assertive challengers created by global shifts of wealth and power. After the Cold War, as a larger and more diverse community of states raised, the old liberal order was not able to reorganize its governance and its foundations were weakened. As Ikenberry points out, the end of the Cold War and the globalization of the old liberal order led to a loss of capacity to function as a security community, which removed the social purpose from it.⁶⁷ The phenomenon of the rise of China might be bringing purpose back to the system, and the NSL and deeper Japanese commitment in security regimes might be the manifestation of new bargains and governance arrangements that are necessary for the strengthening of the foundations of the new order.

In a world of crisis of order, the potential behavior of second-tier countries such as Japan or Germany becomes more important. It is of critical importance whether they will support the system or will turn into another disrupting influence. It should be said that neoliberalism is essentially pragmatic and does not assume that the triumph of a liberal world order as the 'end of history' is a given. The current disturbance can prove to be more than a temporary disruption and might lead into a full-blown crisis and the collapse of the system. In other words, the seas are becoming rough. If the turmoil turns into a full-blown storm, somebody might have to untie Odysseus from the mast.

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66 G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 94, No 1, 2018, p.18.

67 Ibid., p. 17.

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